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This paper presents evidence that companies across three continental European countries
(Belgium, GermanyandtheNetherlands)providevarying degrees ofanalyst recommended
nonﬁnancial disclosures to the marketplace. This study is the ﬁrst to examine the
relationship of Jenkins Committee nonﬁnancial disclosure levels with the accuracy and
dispersion of ﬁnancial analysts’ earnings forecasts. Seemingly unrelated regression tests
show that larger companies and companies with a global focus voluntarily provide higher
levels of both forward looking and historical nonﬁnancial disclosures. Additionally, higher
levels of forward looking nonﬁnancial disclosures are associated with lower dispersion and
higher accuracy in ﬁnancial analysts’ earnings forecasts.
1. Introduction
Inthispaper,weidentifyfactorsthataﬀectnonﬁnancialdisclosurechoices
of ﬁrms in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands. We then examine the
relationship of Jenkins Committee nonﬁnancial disclosure levels with the
accuracy and dispersion of ﬁnancial analysts’ earnings forecasts for ﬁrms
in these three countries. Our two main objectives are: (1) to improve our
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nonﬁnancialdisclosurechoicesinthreeEuropeanUnion(EU)neighbour-
ing countries and, (2) to determine the extent to which voluntary
nonﬁnancial disclosures aﬀect the accuracy and dispersion of ﬁnancial
analysts’ earnings forecasts. This study builds upon prior work by Robb
etal.(2001)dealingwithvoluntarynonﬁnancialdisclosurechoicesofﬁrms
across three Anglo-American countries. In contrast, our paper focuses on
three continental European countries that diﬀer in terms of legal and
institutional setting, ﬁnancial accounting practices and culture. An
additional contribution of this study is that it is the ﬁrst to examine the
relationship of Jenkins Committee nonﬁnancial disclosure levels with the
accuracy and dispersion of ﬁnancial analysts’ earnings forecasts in an
international setting.
We begin by determining the extent to which our sample companies, in
each country, disclose nonﬁnancial information as recommended by
ﬁnancial analysts to the Jenkins Committee. Speciﬁcally, we examine the
relationship between voluntary nonﬁnancial disclosure practices and the
following ﬁrm characteristics: industry classiﬁcation, country of domicile,
geographic dispersion, cross-listings, company size, and compliance with
International Accounting Standards (IASs). We then examine the
relationship of voluntary nonﬁnancial disclosure levels to analysts’
earnings forecast accuracy and dispersion.
Our results show that across our sample ﬁrms, there are statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in disclosure levels for the various nonﬁnancial
information categories identiﬁed in the Jenkins report. Factors such as
ﬁrm size, industry classiﬁcation, degree of geographic dispersion, cross-
listingsonforeignstockexchanges,andcountryofdomicilehelptoexplain
these diﬀerences. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the disclosure of
forward-looking nonﬁnancial information is associated with signiﬁcantly
lowerdispersionlevelsandhigheraccuracyofanalysts’earningsforecasts.
On the other hand, disclosure of historical nonﬁnancial information does
not aﬀect either the dispersion or accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts
in a statistically signiﬁcant manner.
Identifying the factors that encourage corporate nonﬁnancial disclo-
sures may be useful to standard setters in their harmonization delibera-
tions. In addition, examining the relationship of nonﬁnancial disclosure
levels with the accuracy and dispersion of ﬁnancial analysts’ earnings
forecasts may improve our understanding of how analysts generally form
their expectations and the speciﬁc role diﬀerent types of nonﬁnancial
disclosures play in the formation of those expectations.
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relevant literature. Section 3 describes the model and our hypotheses. In
section 4 we describe the data we employ. Sections 5 and 6 present our
results and conclusions respectively.
2. Theory
2.1. Nonﬁnancial Disclosures
Prior literature suggests that there are beneﬁts to capital markets from
ﬁrms voluntarily disclosing information. For example, increased dis-
closure reduces the cost of capital (Barry and Brown, 1984, 1985, 1986;
Easley and O’Hara, 2000), increases liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia,
1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994), and increases information intermedia-
tion (Diamond, 1985; Bhushan, 1989; Lang and Lundhom, 1996). In
general,theempiricalliteraturesupportstheexistenceofthesebeneﬁts(see
Healy and Palepu, 2001). In the absence of disclosure costs or uncertainty
about the existence of information, the theoretical literature suggests that
ﬁrms should follow a full disclosure policy (Jovanovic, 1982; Verrecchia,
1983). The theory essentially is that when a price-maximizing manager
withholds information from the market, investors become suspicious
about the quality of the investment and they discount its quality to the
point where the manager is always better oﬀ with a full disclosure policy.
However, in an international setting, it is not clear what inﬂuence, if any,
cross-country factors may have on voluntary disclosures of nonﬁnancial
information.
Prior research documents that there is substantial variation in ﬁrms’
ﬁnancial reporting practices across nations (Hope, 2003). The level of
required disclosure is known to aﬀect ﬁrms’ levels of voluntary disclosure.
This variation in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial reporting contributes to diﬀerential
information ﬂows that can aﬀect the allocation of resources (SEC, 2000).
Totheextentthatinvestors’investmentdecisionsaredependentonhaving
adequate information regarding the eﬃciency with which assets are
employed by the ﬁrm, any variation in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial reporting practices
across national borders can dramatically aﬀect the allocation of resources
across capital markets.
There is evidence that the extent of ﬁnancial disclosure varies among
ﬁrms with respect to ﬁrm size (Healy and Palepu, 1994), industry, and
listings on foreign exchanges (Choi, 1973; Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992).
The culture in which the disclosing ﬁrm primarily operates also aﬀects the
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Zarzeski, 1996; Adhikari et al., 1998). Belgium, Germany and the
Netherlands are dissimilar in terms of Hofstede’s (1980) traditional
cultural dimensions. Gray (1988) associates the Netherlands with a
relativelyhighleveloftransparency,Germanywithahighlevelofsecrecy,
and Belgium between the Netherlands and Germany; Belgium is more
secretive than transparent. The accounting rules across these countries
sharesomecommoncharacteristics,butarealsouniqueinmanyways.For
instance, accounting in the Netherlands is quite comparable with Anglo-
American accounting. Financial reporting in Belgium and Germany are
both strongly inﬂuenced by corporate law and taxation, but diﬀer from
eachotherinanumberofrespects,especiallyregardingtheemphasisgiven
to uniform accounting practices (Radebaugh and Gray, 1993). Leuz et al.
(2002) classify Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands as insider
economies with a strong legal enforcement. However, the three countries
clearly show variation in their legal and institutional setting. First,
comparatively speaking, the Netherlands has the highest outside investor
rights, followed by Germany and Belgium (La Porta et al., 1998; Leuz
et al., 2002). Second, the importance of the equity market as a source of
ﬁrm capital is the highest in the Netherlands, followed by Belgium and
Germany (La Porta et al., 1997; Leuz et al., 2002). Finally, there is large
variation in ownership concentration among the three countries: owner-
ship is most concentrated in Belgium, followed by Germany and the
Netherlands (La Porta et al., 1998; Leuz et al., 2002).
The Robb et al. (2001) exploratory study developed an in-depth
nonﬁnancial disclosure scoring system from the preferences of US and
non-US ﬁnancial analysts. Their study examined levels of business
disclosures over and above those that are required by accounting






American ﬁrms provide similar nonﬁnancial disclosures. Given their
observed diﬀerences in nonﬁnancial disclosures among Anglo-American
markets, we would expect to see even more pronounced diﬀerences in
reported nonﬁnancial information across countries that diﬀer in terms of
legal and institutional setting, ﬁnancial accounting practices and culture.
Although Hussein (1996) concludes that it is diﬃcult to capture the
richness and complexity of the ‘culture-ﬁnancial reporting’ relationship,
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solution for those companies active in the globalization of business and
capital markets. The ﬁndings of our study could have important





nonﬁnancial disclosures in a European context. Value relevance in this
study refers to the usefulness of nonﬁnancial disclosures to ﬁnancial
analysts when preparing their earnings forecast estimates. Eccles et al.
(2001) note that one of the best ways to get the market’s attention (and
ﬁnancial analysts’ attention) is to voluntarily provide much more
information. In a mini-survey of high-tech companies, Eccles et al.
(2001) found that 75% of ﬁnancial analysts and 62% of investors agreed
that better disclosure would increase analyst following in countries with
low levels of analyst following.
Nichols(1989)andSchipper(1991)suggestthatthebehaviorofanalysts
may provideindirect insights into the unobservable beliefs of investors. In
particular, analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion can be viewed as a
measure of investors’ uncertainty about a ﬁrm’s future economic
performance. While there is a substantial literature about the properties
of analysts’ earnings forecasts, there are no studies that consider how
nonﬁnancial disclosures aﬀect analysts’ earnings forecasts. Jennings
(1987) and Baginski and Hassell (1990) provide evidence that analysts
revise their forecasts in response to the release of management forecasts
and Waymire (1986) ﬁnds that the public release of management forecasts
results in anincrease in analysts’ forecastaccuracy.These ﬁndingssuggest
that additional disclosures by a ﬁrm can impact the accuracy and
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. Lang and Lundholm (1996) examine the
relationship between the disclosure practices of ﬁrms and analysts’
behavior. They provide evidence that ﬁrms with more informative
disclosure policies have a larger number of analysts following, more
forecasts and less volatility in forecast revisions. Lang and Lundholm
(1996) suggest that the potential beneﬁts of disclosure include in-
creased investor following, reduced estimation risk and reduced
information asymmetry, all of which lead to a lower cost of capital for
the ﬁrm.
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internationalsetting(SaudagaranandMeek,1997;Hope,2001)andonthe
properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts in an international setting (Basu
et al., 1998; Chang et al., 2000, Hope, 2003), no prior multi-country study
has examined the association between ﬁrm-level nonﬁnancial disclosures
and forecast properties. As Hope (2001) suggests, given standard setters’
emphasis on the importance of accounting policy disclosures, standard
setters should be interested in whether the level of such disclosures is
associated with real economic eﬀects. We document these eﬀects in our
paper and suggest that our ﬁndings can be relevant for managers when
developing corporate nonﬁnancial disclosure policies.
3. Model and Hypotheses
Our ﬁrst objective is to identify factors that aﬀect voluntary nonﬁnancial
disclosurechoicesofﬁrmsinBelgium,Germany,andtheNetherlands.We
then examine the relationship of Jenkins Committee nonﬁnancial
disclosure levels with the accuracy and dispersion of ﬁnancial analysts’
earnings forecasts for ﬁrms in these three countries. With respect to our
ﬁrst objective, we test the following hypothesis:
H1: The amount of voluntary nonﬁnancial disclosure diﬀers across




(Healy and Palepu, 1994; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999), industry, and listing




proﬁt-shifting studies (Klassen et al., 1993; Harris, 1993). To test H1, we





DISC1y65an aggregate disclosure score for each of 6 categories
including: environment around the company, strategy and management,
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customers (see the appendix for a listing of items in each disclosure
category);
SIZE5the natural log of total sales in constant (US) dollars;
IAS5a dummy variable indicating compliance with International
Accounting Standards, where compliance with IAS is coded 1 and
noncompliance is coded 0;
#GEOSEG5the number of geographic segments a company reports;
XLIST5the number of listings on foreign stock exchanges;
INDi5dummy variables representing industry classiﬁcation (7 in-
dustries; see Tables 2 and 3 for details);
COUNTRYi5dummy variables representing the country of domicile
of each ﬁrm; and,
e5error term.
A disclosure scoring system as in Robb et al. (2001) was developed to
measure the extent of nonﬁnancial disclosures; see appendix. The
disclosure scoring system is based on the List of Nonﬁnancial Information
Desired by Users from the AICPA Jenkins Committee database.
The information items were grouped into six categories: (1) the
environment around the company, (2) strategy and management, (3)
company trends, (4) the environment of the company, (5) production and
(6) customers. The ﬁrst three categories represent forward-looking
nonﬁnancial disclosures. The last three categories represent historical
nonﬁnancial disclosures.
The control variables are chosen in part based on prior research.
Consistent with the established literature, we predict positive signs on
SIZE, IAS, #GEOSEG, and XLIST since nonﬁnancial disclosures have
been shown to be positively associated with larger companies, companies
which comply with international accounting standards, companies with
larger numbers of geographic segments and companies that are listed on
multiple exchanges. We expect that the level of nonﬁnancial disclosure,
both forward looking and historical, is higher in the Netherlands
compared to Germany and Belgium. This expectation stems from the fact
that the Netherlands is characterized by a higher level of transparency, a
more developed equity market and a lower level of ownership concentra-
tion compared to Germany and Belgium.
Our second objective is to examine the relationship of nonﬁnancial
disclosures with analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion. Speciﬁcally,
we test the following hypotheses:
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level of voluntary nonﬁnancial information.
H3: The accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts is positively related to the
level of voluntary nonﬁnancial information.
We measure dispersion by the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts
dividedbytheabsolutevalueofthemeananalystforecastforanindividual
company. Accuracy is measured by the absolute value of the diﬀerence
between the mean analysts’ forecasts and the actual earnings of the ﬁrm,
scaled by actual earnings.
Barron et al. (1999) show that, in a theoretical model, under certain
conditions, ﬁrm-provided disclosures have a greater impact on forecast
dispersion than on forecast accuracy. In particular, when information
asymmetry among analysts is above a certain threshold, increased public
disclosure has a greater impact on forecast dispersion than on forecast
error, since public disclosure draws all forecasts closer to actual earnings
realizations while also causing a reduction in asymmetry. Consistent with
this prediction, Lang and Lundholm (1996) ﬁnd a negative (positive)
association between total annual report disclosure ratings by the
Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) and
forecast dispersion (accuracy) in the US. The dispersion of analysts’
forecasts reﬂects uncertainty about ﬁrms’ future economic performance
(Barron and Stuerke, 1998). Although theory suggests that increased
disclosure can either increase or decrease forecast dispersion (Harris and
Raviv, 1993), most arguments support an association with reduced
forecast dispersion.
No prior study has investigated the association between ﬁrm-level
forward looking and historical voluntary nonﬁnancial disclosures and
earnings forecast properties. It is questionable whether ﬁnancial analysts
consider both forward-looking and historical nonﬁnancial disclosures as
containingequallyusefulinformation.Ifso,wewouldexpectthatforward
looking and historical nonﬁnancial disclosures lead to more accuracy and
less dispersion in the earnings forecasts among ﬁnancial analysts.
To test H2 and H3, we employ the following models:
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DISP5the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts;
ACC5the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts;
SIZE5the natural logarithm of total sales;
LTD/CE5long-term debt divided by common equity;
ROE5return on equity;
COUNTRYi5dummy variables representing the country of domicile
of each ﬁrm;
NOEST5the number of ﬁnancial analysts following the company;
DEAR5the absolute value of the change in earnings from the prior
year, scaled by total sales;
TD5the total nonﬁnancial disclosures (i.e., TFLD 1 THD);
TFLD5the total forward looking nonﬁnancial disclosures (i.e.,
environment around the company (DISC 1)1strategy and management
(DISC 2)1company trends (DISC 3));
THD5the total historical nonﬁnancial disclosures (i.e., environment
of the company (DISC 4)1production (DISC 5)1customers (DISC 6));
e5the error term.
Each oftheabove variablesis ﬁrmspeciﬁc. Equations(2)and(3)ofmodel
1 focus on the impact of the total level of nonﬁnancial disclosures on the
dispersion and accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. In equations (4)
and (5) of model 2 a distinction is made between forward-looking
nonﬁnancial disclosures and historical nonﬁnancial disclosures.
We select control variables consistent with those employed in prior
studies (see for example Hope, 2001). First, we control for factors related
to the management environment. In this respect, we include three control
variables: ﬁrm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total sales
(SIZE); leverage, measured by long-term debt divided by common equity
(LTD/CE); and proﬁtability, measured by return on equity (ROE).
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management incentives and the ability to manage earnings by using
dummy variables for the country of domicile of each ﬁrm (COUNTRYi).
Third, we control for factors related to the analyst environment. In
particular, we control for competitive pressure among analysts, as
measured by the number of analysts (NOEST) following each company.





companies from the following manufacturing industries: automobiles,
chemicals, construction, electronic equipment, machinery & equipment,
metal, and pharmaceuticals. These industries were selected since they
disclose a signiﬁcant amount of information in their annual reports and
typically engage in a considerable volume of international business
transactions.
Given the time-consuming process of coding the annual reports, our
objective was to compose a representative sample of 120 ﬁrms, equally
divided between Belgium, Germanyand the Netherlands. For the selected
manufacturing industries, we determined the number of companies that
were followed by IBES at the time.It was not possible to identify a sample
of 40 Belgium companies for which forecast data and annual report data
were available. (Data were available for only 32 Belgium companies.)
Hence, it was decided to increase both the sample of Dutch and German
companies by4 to achieve a total sample size of120. If a suﬃcient number
of companies were followed by IBES in a particular industry in Germany
or the Netherlands, we randomly selected companies from that industry.
Forcertainindustries,however,noneoronlyasmallnumberofcompanies
were followed by IBES (for example, the pharmaceuticals and metal
industries in the Netherlands). To compensate for this, we increased the
number of companies in other industries for which forecast data was
availableonarandombasis(forexample,theconstructionandmachinery
&equipmentindustriesintheNetherlands).Thisresultedinatotalsample
size of 120 companies: 32 in Belgium, 44 in Germany, and 44 in the
Netherlands.
We collected corporate annual reports for the 120 ﬁrms described
above. The home-language annual report was read by the same author,
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measures. The coding was validated for a random subsample in each
country by a second individual. The disclosure-scoring sheet in the
appendix shows the categories of nonﬁnancial and ﬁnancial disclosures
encoded for each company.
To classifytheinformation fromeachannual report,weusedadetailed
nonﬁnancial disclosure scoring system based speciﬁcally on the List of
Nonﬁnancial Information Desired by Users from the AICPA Jenkins
Committee database (see Appendix). The detailed information items were
thengroupedintothefollowingsixcategories:theenvironmentaroundthe
company, strategy and management, company trends, the environment
of the company, production and customers. Each category contains:
(1)informationthatlikelyexistsabouteverycompanyand(2)information
that ﬁnancial analysts and investors have indicated is important for
company valuation. A rate of 0 (no disclosure) or 1 (disclosure) was given
to each disclosure item.
In addition to annual reports and IBES forecast data, we gathered
Worldscope data for 1999. All of our sample companies are followed by
IBES. The International Brokers’ Estimate System provided analysts’
annual earnings forecasts, actual annual earnings, standard deviation of
analysts’ forecasts, and the number of ﬁnancial analysts following each
company. We used the forecasts from the end of the month preceding the
earnings announcement, i.e., the one-month ahead forecast.
2 There are 32
Belgian, 44 German and 44 Dutch companies in our sample. A single year
of data (1999) was examined in order to eliminate potential confounding
eﬀects of changes in reporting standards or practices over time. All
ﬁnancialdatawereconvertedtoUSdollarsusingtheappropriatespotrate
as of the company’s balance sheet date.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive Statistics
Mean disclosure scores by country are reported in Table 1. The scores are
the sums of the ratings (0 or 1) for each of the speciﬁc disclosure items in
each of the major categories (see the appendix for the disclosure checklist
items). For example, the category ‘environment around the company’
contains twelve speciﬁc items. Thus, the total score possible for this
category could range from zero to twelve.
3
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Table1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables Across Three Countries
Dependent Variables Netherlands n544 Belgium n532 Germany n544
Forward-Looking Nonﬁnancial Disclosure Mean Mean Mean
Environment Around Company (EACO) (maximum score of 12) 3.90 3.00 3.09
Strategy (STGY) (maximum score of 14) 6.75 6.68 6.13
Trends (TRDS) (maximum score of 5) 1.61 1.21 1.18
Total Forward Looking Disclosures (maximum score of 31) 12.27 10.90 10.56
Historical Nonﬁnancial Disclosure
Environment of Company (EFCO) (maximum score of 7) 2.97 2.68 2.52
Production (PROD) (maximum score of 18) 5.50 5.53 5.72
Customers (CUST) (maximum score of 9) 1.72 2.00 1.68
Total Historical Disclosures (maximum score of 34) 10.20 10.21 9.93
Total Disclosure Score (maximum score of 65) 22.47 21.12 20.50
Independent Variables
Mean number of Geographic Segments (#GEOSEG) 3.31 2.56 2.77
Mean sales in millions of US$ (SIZE) 1,305 1,384 6,243
Number of ﬁrms with listings on foreign exchanges (XLIST)n 55 2 4
nTheaveragenumberofcross-listingsperﬁrmis0.5fortheNetherlands,0.43forBelgium,and1.06forGermany.Thecorrelationbetweencross-listingand
ﬁrm size and between number of geographic segments and ﬁrm size is 0.656 and 0.213, respectively. The correlations between cross-listing and country,
between cross-listing and industry and between cross-listing and number of geographic segments are -.15, 0.21 and 0.32, respectively.





























.The Dutch companies have the highest level of total forward-looking
nonﬁnancial disclosure and the highest level in all three individual
forward-looking nonﬁnancial disclosure categories. Belgium and the
Netherlandshaveasimilarleveloftotalhistoricaldisclosures,followedby
Germany.
Table 2 reports mean sales and the number of geographic segments by
industry. The automotive industry is the largest in terms of sales dollars
and it is the most geographically dispersed. The chemical industry is the
leastgeographicallydispersedintermsofnumberofgeographicsegments.
Electricalequipmentisthesmallestintermsofsalesdollars.Table3shows
the industry by country breakdown of the ﬁrms included in the sample.
5.2. Test of Means Statistics
The tests of means are reported in Table 4 and provide support for
Hypothesis1.GermanyandtheNetherlandsprovidestatisticallydiﬀerent
levels of total forward-looking nonﬁnancial disclosures (po0.05), with
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Electrical Equipment 2.09 3,602,272
Machinery & Equipment 2.57 609,916
Metal 3 6,648,550
Pharmaceuticals 3 2,466,522
Table3. Descriptive Statistics: Number of Firms Country Industry
Industry Netherlands Belgium Germany Total
Automotive 7 1 6 14
Chemicals 5 8 6 19
Construction 10 5 6 21
Electrical Equipment 8 7 7 22
Machinery & Equipment 13 7 6 26
Metal 0 3 5 8
Pharmaceuticals 1 1 8 10
Total 44 32 44 120
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003.Belgium providing a level of disclosure between that of the other two
countries. However, total historical nonﬁnancial disclosures are not
statistically diﬀerent among these countries.
Table 5 reports the test results of the relationships between analyst
characteristics and country. Panel A describes mean analysts’ character-
istics by country. The largest number of analysts is found in the
Netherlands, followed by Germany and Belgium. The dispersion of
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Table4. Test of Means. Nonﬁnancial Disclosure Scores by Country
Dependent Variables Netherlands Belgium Germany
Total Forward Looking Disclosures 12.27 (a),(b) 10.90 (b) 10.56 (a)
Total Historical Disclosures 10.20 10.21 9.93
(a) The Netherlands and Germany are statistically diﬀerent, Bonferroni-test: Mean diﬀer-
ence51.70, Sig. 0.018 (1-sided).
(b) The Netherlands and Belgium are statistically diﬀerent, Bonferroni-test: Mean diﬀer-
ence51.36, Sig. 0.09 (1-sided).
Table5. Tests of National Inﬂuences on Analysts’ Characteristics
Panel A: Mean Analysts’ Characteristics Data
Analysts’ Characteristics Netherlands Belgium Germany
Number of analysts (a) 17.09 8.60 13.73
Dispersion of Analysts’ Earnings forecasts (b) 0.24 0.16 0.28
Accuracy of Analysts’ Earnings forecastsn (c) 0.30 0.66 0.52
Panel B: ANOVA Results
Source of variation: Country
Analysts’ Characteristics F-value Signiﬁcance
Number of analysts 6.16 0.03
Dispersion of Analysts’ Earnings forecasts 0.80 0.44
Accuracy of Analysts’ Earnings forecasts 2.03 0.13
(a) The Netherlands is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from Germany and Belgium at 0.05 level.
(b) Belgium is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from Germany and the Netherlands at respectively 0.05 and
0.1 level.
(c) The Netherlands is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from Germany and Belgium at respectively 0.1 and
0.05 level.
nNote: A low reported value indicates a high accuracy.
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003.analysts’ forecasts of earnings is the highest in Germany, followed by the
Netherlands and Belgium. The accuracy
4 of analysts’ forecasts is the
highest in the Netherlands, followed by Germany and Belgium. This
ﬁnding, in light of the country-by-country diﬀerences reported in Table 4
suggests that higher total disclosure by ﬁrms improves analysts’ accuracy
andreducesthedispersionamongtheirforecasts,andprovidessupportfor
H2 and H3. The Netherlands has the highest disclosure level of forward-
looking nonﬁnancial information and the highest analyst forecast
accuracy.
Panel A of Table 5 presents by country, the average number of analysts
following the companies in our sample and the mean dispersion and
accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. The average number of analysts
following our sample of Dutch, Belgium and German companies is 17.09,
8.60 and 13.73 respectively. The dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts,
measured as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts divided by the
absolute value of the mean analyst forecast for an individual company, is
onaverage0.24intheNetherlands,0.16inBelgium,and0.28inGermany.
Theaccuracyoftheanalysts’earningsforecasts,measuredbytheabsolute
value of the diﬀerence between the mean analysts’ forecasts and the actual
earnings of the ﬁrm, scaled by actual earnings is on average 0.30 in the
Netherlands, 0.66 in Belgium and 0.52 in Germany. Panel B of Table 5
indicates that the number of analysts following a sample ﬁrm varies
signiﬁcantly by country. Therefore, it is possible that the combination of
low dispersion and low accuracy in Belgium (in Panel A) is due to the low
numberofanalystsfollowingthesamplecompaniesinthatcountry.Inthe
next section, we conduct regression tests to condition on factors that may
help explain the unconditional results reported in Tables 4 and 5.
5.3. Regression Statistics
Weestimateequation(1)usingseeminglyunrelatedregression(SUR)since
the dependent variables are correlated.
5 The dependent variables are the
sumsrangingfrom0to65ofthe0-1ratingsforthespeciﬁcdisclosureitems
in each of the six major disclosure categories. We use the Netherlands as
the base country so we use dummy variables for Germany and Belgium
only. Results of the regressions for forward looking and historical
disclosures, and for each of the six disclosure categories are reported in
Table 6a and Table 6b respectively.
The results in Table 6a show that the level of total forward looking
nonﬁnancial disclosures is signiﬁcantly lower in both Germany and
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r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003.Belgium, compared to the Netherlands (support for hypothesis 1). When
considering the three forward looking nonﬁnancial disclosure categories
separately, Germany scores signiﬁcantly lower in each category. Belgium
diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the Netherlands in two categories (environment
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IAS  0.840 0.932
( 0.666) (1.035)
GEOSEG  0.041  0.015
( 0.324) ( 0.174)
XLIST 0.049 0.128
(0.104) (0.373)
CHEM 0.477  1.014
(0.505) ( 1.502)
CON  0.691  1.470nn
( 0.819) ( 2.439)
EE  0.398  1.489nn
( 0.449) ( 2.348)
ME  0.164  0.566
( 0.197) ( 0.951)
MET  1.007  0.798
( 0.867) ( 0.963)
PHAR 2.358nn  1.078
(2.109) ( 1.350)
GER  2.823nnn  0.835n
( 4.462) ( 1.849)
BEL  1.442nn 0.129
( 2.272) (0.286)
Chi-squared 63.508 37.508
p-value of model 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.346 0.238
Adjusted R-squared 0.281 0.152
N 120 120
1The table reports seemingly unrelated regression coeﬃcients with z-statistics:
npo.10, nnpo.05, nnnpo.01.
2SIZE: Natural log of total sales in US$
IAS5Reporting in compliance with International Accounting Standards (dummy variable).
GEOSEG5number of geographic segments, XLIST5number of listings on a foreign stock
exchange.
Industry Classiﬁcations: AUTO5automotive (industry of reference), CHEM5chemicals,
CON5construction, EE5electrical equipment, ME5machinery and equipment, MET5me-
tal, PHAR5pharmaceuticals
Countries: BEL5Belgium, GER5Germany, NETH5Netherlands (country of reference).
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Forward Looking Disclosures Historical Disclosures
EACO STGY TRDS EFCO PROD CUST
Independent variables
3
CONSTANT  0.759 1.246 0.647 0.642 3.856nnn 0.940
( 0.651) (0.844) (1.342) (0.979) (3.214) (1.147)
SIZE 0.441nnn 0.356nnn 0.084nn 0.188nn 0.192nn 0.060
(4.885) (3.123) (2.257) (3.718) (2.077) (0.957)
IAS 0.373  1.035  0.213 0.756nn 0.162 0.013
(0.623) (-1.366) ( 0.863) (2.244) (0.264) (0.031)
GEOSEG  0.135nn 0.160nn  0.035  0.059nnn  0.041 0.085nn
( 2.236) (2.094) ( 1.424) ( 1.754) ( 0.673) (2.018)
XLIST  0.127 0.313  0.107 0.043  0.066 0.151
( 0.557) (1.083) ( 1.135) (0.340) ( 0.284) (0.941)
CHEM  0.287 0.572 0.013 0.463nnn  0.689  0.788nn
( 0.639) (1.006) (0.074) (1.832) ( 1.491) ( 2.498)
CON  0.933nn 0.111 0.135 0.137  1.012nn  0.596nn
( 2.324) (0.219) (0.817) (0.609) ( 2.465) ( 2.115)
EE  0.823n 0.471  0.071  0.049  1.141nnn  0.297
( 1.949) (0.883) ( 0.411) ( 0.210) ( 2.631) ( 1.005)
ME  0.499 0.320  0.021 0.067  0.532  0.102
( 1.260) (0.640) ( 0.134) (0.305) ( 1.307) ( 0.366)
MET  1.076nnn 0.345  0.263 0.480  0.574  0.703n
( 1.949) (0.494) ( 1.156) (1.546) ( 1.013) ( 1.816)
PHAR  0.141 1.690nn 0.336  0.314  0.701  0.061
( 0.266) (2.513) (1.530) ( 1.052) ( 1.284) ( 0.165)
GER  1.317nnn  1.091nnn  0.468nnn  0.772nnn 0.027  0.090
( 4.379) ( 2.869) ( 3.768) ( 4.564) (0.088) ( 0.426)
BEL  0.950nnn  0.049  0.393nnn  0.424nn 0.080 0.474nn
( 3.147) ( 0.129) ( 3.156) ( 2.499) (0.258) (2.237)
Chi-squared 57.682 54.665 33.883 60.519 18.610 24.198
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.098 0.019
R-squared 0.324 0.313 0.220 0.335 0.134 0.167
Adjusted R-squared 0.265 0.230 0.130 0.260 0.038 0.068
N 120 120 120 120 120 120
1The table reports seemingly unrelated regression coeﬃcients with z-statistics:
npo.10, nnpo.05, nnnpo.01.
2Forward Looking Disclosures: EACO5environment around the company, STGY5strategy
and management, TRDS5trends,
Historical Disclosures: EFCO5environment of the company, PROD5production, CUST5
customers and markets.
3SIZE: Natural log of total sales in US$
IAS5Reporting in compliance with International Accounting Standards (dummy variable);
GEOSEG5number of geographic segments; XLIST5number of listings on a foreign stock
exchange.
Industry Classiﬁcations: AUTO5automotive (industry of reference), CHEM5chemicals,
CON5construction, EE5electrical equipment, ME5machinery and equipment, MET5me-
tal, PHAR5pharmaceuticals.
Countries: BEL5Belgium, GER5Germany, NETH5Netherlands (country of reference).
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003.around the company and trends). With respect to historical nonﬁnancial
disclosures,itappearsthatGermanyprovidesasigniﬁcantlylowerlevelof
total disclosure than the Netherlands. In particular, German companies
provide a signiﬁcantly lower level of disclosure related to the environment
of the company. Belgium diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the Netherlands in the
environment of the company and customers categories.
Table 6a and 6b shows that ﬁrm size is positively and signiﬁcantly
related to the level of total forward looking nonﬁnancial disclosures and
the level of total historical nonﬁnancial disclosures. With respect to the
individual disclosure categories, ﬁrm size is positively and signiﬁcantly
related with the environment around the company, strategy and manage-
ment, trends, environment of the company and production. Contrary to
our expectations, companies reporting in compliance with IAS do not
disclose more nonﬁnancial information in any signiﬁcant way, except for
the category ‘environment of the company’.
Consistent with prior literature and as expected, industry classiﬁcation
is signiﬁcant. The pharmaceutical industry provides signiﬁcantly more
forward looking nonﬁnancial information, while construction and
electrical equipment provide signiﬁcantly less historical nonﬁnancial
disclosures. The diﬀerences in industry signiﬁcance across disclosure
categories may result from the unavoidable use of dummy variables to
encode these measures.
Contrary to our expectations, the level of nonﬁnancial disclosure does
not appear to be directly related to the degree of geographic dispersion
(GEOSEGM) or to the number of listings on a foreign stock exchange
(XLISTINGS). However, the lack of evidence may be due to multi-
collinearity. Indeed, the Pearson correlation matrix (not reported)
indicates that total sales are strongly correlated with the number of
listings on a foreign stock exchange. Therefore, we re-run our seemingly
unrelatedregressionswithoutthesizevariable.Theresultsarepresentedin
Table 7.
In Table 7, both GEOSEGM and XLISTINGS have a positive,
signiﬁcant sign for the level of total forward-looking nonﬁnancial
disclosures. The level of total historical nonﬁnancial disclosures is also
signiﬁcantly higher when companies list on more foreign stock exchanges.
Consequently, these results suggest that companies with a global focus
provide higher levels of nonﬁnancial disclosures in their annual reports.
Wenowturntotheresultsforearningsforecastsbasedonmodels1and
2. The regression results with respect to the dispersion and accuracy of
analysts’ earnings forecasts are presented in Table 8.
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3 Total Forward EACO STGY TRDS Total Historical EFCO PROD CUST
CONSTANT 11.956nnn 4.631nnn 5.604nnn 1.676nnn 10.844nnn 2.950nnn 6.211nnn 1.681nnn
(13.642) (11.072) (11.157) (10.403) (18.117) (13.005) (15.547) (0.000)
IAS  0.278 0.646  0.815  0.161 1.205 0.873nn 0.281 0.050
( 0.203) (0.989) ( 1.038) ( 0.642) (1.289) (2.463) (0.452) (0.120)
GEOSEG 0.252nn 0.007 0.275n  0.008 0.127 0.001 0.020 0.105
(2.084) (0.135) (3.963) ( 0.371) (1.539) (0.050) (0.374) (2.825)
XLIST 0.943n 0.306 0.664nn  0.024 0.563n 0.229n 0.123 0.211
(1.950) (1.329) (2.397) ( 0.274) (1.706) (1.834) (0.558) (1.420)
CHEM  0.198  0.615 0.306 0.048  1.343n 0.322  0.832n  0.833
( 0.194) ( 1.265) (0.525) ( 0.261) ( 1.928) (1.222) ( 1.790) ( 2.661)
CON  0.605  0.891nn 0.145 0.143  1.428nn 0.155  0.993nn  0.590
( 0.658) ( 2.028) (0.275) (0.847) ( 2.271) (0.652) ( 2.367) ( 2.087)
EE  1.463  1.340nnn 0.052  0.170  2.008nnn  0.271  1.367nnn  0.369
( 1.561) ( 2.996) (0.098) ( 0.989) ( 3.136) ( 1.118) ( 3.199) ( 1.281)
ME  1.123  0.965nn  0.056  0.110  1.034n  0.131  0.736n  0.166
( 1.273) ( 2.292) ( 0.111) ( 0.683) ( 1.715) ( 0.576) ( 1.829) ( 0.613)
MET  0.594  0.875 0.507  0.225  0.597 0.565n  0.487  0.676
( 0.471) ( 1.453) (0.701) ( 0.970) ( 0.693) (1.730) ( 0.846) ( 1.743)
PHAR 1.847  0.390 1.489nn 0.288  1.327  0.421  0.810  0.096
(1.521) ( 0.673) ( 2.139) (1.293) ( 1.600) ( 1.339) ( 1.463) ( 0.257)
GER  2.425nn  1.124nnn  0.935nn  0.431nnn  0.641  0.689nnn 0.111  0.063
( 3.544) ( 3.442) ( 2.385) ( 3.430) ( 1.373) ( 3.893) (0.358) ( 0.302)
BEL  1.167n  0.816nn 0.059  0.368nnn 0.264  0.367nn 0.138 0.492
( 1.692) ( 2.479) (0.149) ( 2.903) (0.560) ( 2.055) (0.440) (2.325)
Chi-squared 34.170 28.210 41.536 27.617 24.687 41.872 13.802 23.105












































































3 Total Forward EACO STGY TRDS Total Historical EFCO PROD CUST
R-squared 0.221 0.190 0.257 0.187 0.170 0.258 0.103 0.161
Adjusted R-squared 0.128 0.100 0.155 0.104 0.092 0.182 0.025 0.065
N 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
1The table reports seemingly unrelated regression coeﬃcients with z-statistics:
npo.10, nnpo.05, nnnpo.01.
2TFLD5total forward looking disclosure, THD5total historical disclosure, EACO5environment around the company, STGY5strategy and
management, TRDS5trends, EFCO5environment of the company, PROD5production, CUST5customers and markets.
3IAS5Reporting in compliance with International Accounting Standards (Dummy variable).
GEOSEGM5number of geographic segments, XLIST5number of listings on a foreign stock exchange.
Industry Classiﬁcations: AUTO5automotive (industry of reference), CHEM5chemicals, CON5construction; EE5electrical equipment, ME5
machinery and equipment, MET5metal, PHAR5pharmaceuticals.












































































Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Independent Variables
2 Total Disclosure Subdivision Disclosure Total Disclosure Subdivision Disclosure
CONSTANT 0.378 0.149 0.807n 0.672
(0.791) (0.317) (1.855) (1.537)
SIZE 3.40E-02 0.042  1.8E-03 3.18E-03
(0.798) (0.988) ( 0.047) (0.080)
LTD/CE 7.13E-04 5.68E-04 1.23E-03n 1.18E-03
(0.904) (0.725) (1.711) (1.626)
ROE  4.0E-03n  3.06E-03  2.6E-03  2.30E-03
( 1.915) ( 1.456) ( 1.355) ( 1.178)
GER  7.2E-02  0.107  4.3E-02  4.93E-02
( 0.602) ( 0.886) ( 0.390) ( 0.439)
BEL  0.174  0.219n 0.289nn 0.278nn
( 1.419) ( 1.772) (2.597) (2.416)
NOEST  4.2E-03  6.44E-03  3.9E-03  5.03E-03
( 0.574) ( 0.889) ( 0.591) ( 0.747)
D EAR  1.8E-06  3.37E-06 3.36E-06 2.89E-06
( 0.499) ( 0.897) (1.002) (0.829)
TD  2.0E-02n  2.2E-02nn
( 1.760) ( 2.064)
TFLD  4.10E-02nn  2.59E-02n
( 2.454) ( 1.669)












































































Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Independent Variables
2 Total Disclosure Subdivision Disclosure Total Disclosure Subdivision Disclosure
R-squared 0.114 0.142 0.270 0.265
Adjusted R-squared 0.035 0.055 0.204 0.190
F-value N 1.435 1.622 4.112nnn 3.524nnn
120 120 120 120
1The table reports OLS regression coeﬃcients with t-statistics:
npo.10, nnpo.05, nnnpo.01.
2SIZE5natural logarithm of total sales, LTD/CE5Long-term debt/Common equity, ROE5Return on equity, GER5Germany, BEL5Belgium,
NOEST5number of analysts following the company, DEAR5absolute value of change in earnings scaled by total sales, TD5total disclosure,





























.The results in Table 8 provide support for hypotheses 2 and 3.
6 The
results of dispersion model 1 show that disclosure of nonﬁnancial
information signiﬁcantly decreases the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts.
For example, a 5-point increase in the total disclosure score decreases
dispersion by 0.10 (i.e., ﬁve times the value of the regression coeﬃcient).
Return on equity appears to be a signiﬁcant control variable since less
proﬁtable ﬁrms are related to higher dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. A
subdivision of total nonﬁnancial disclosure into forward looking
nonﬁnancial information and historical nonﬁnancial information is
presented in dispersion model 2. The results show that the disclosure of
forward-looking nonﬁnancial information signiﬁcantly decreases the
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, whereas disclosure of historical
nonﬁnancial information does not. The dispersion of analysts’ forecasts
for Belgian companies appears to be signiﬁcantly higher compared to
analysts’ forecasts for Dutch companies.
The results of accuracy model 1 suggest that the disclosure of
nonﬁnancial information signiﬁcantly increases accuracy.
7 Again, for
example, a5-pointincrease inthe totaldisclosurescoreincreases accuracy
by0.11(i.e.,ﬁvetimesthevalueoftheregressioncoeﬃcient).Asapointof
clariﬁcation, note that a higher reported value of accuracy indicates a
lower accuracy level. Two control variables appear signiﬁcant. Higher
leverageisrelatedtoaloweraccuracy(LTD/CE),andforecastsforBelgian
companies are signiﬁcantly less accurate than forecasts for Dutch
companies. A subdivision of total nonﬁnancial disclosure into forward
looking nonﬁnancial information and historical nonﬁnancial information
is presented in accuracy model 2. Similar to the dispersion results, we see
that the disclosure of forward looking nonﬁnancial information is
strongly associated with an increase in the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts,
whilethedisclosureofhistoricalnonﬁnancialinformationdoesnotappear
to aﬀect accuracy. The COUNTRY dummy for Belgium remains
signiﬁcant. In summary, the results in Table 8 provide evidence that the
disclosure of forward looking nonﬁnancial information is strongly
associated with a decrease in dispersion and an increase in accuracy,
whereas the disclosure of historical nonﬁnancial information does not
appear to aﬀect the characteristics of analysts’ earnings forecasts.
6. Conclusions and Limitations
In this study we attempt to improve our understanding of the factors that
determine the voluntary nonﬁnancial disclosure choices of ﬁrms in three
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Weexaminethedegreetowhichcompaniesinthesethreecountriesadhere
to the nonﬁnancial disclosure recommendations of the Jenkins Commit-
tee, and we examine the factors that may inﬂuence the nonﬁnancial
reporting decisions of our sample ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that companies that are
more internationally oriented, and/or companies that are larger, tend to
provide more nonﬁnancial disclosures. We observe some industry eﬀects
with pharmaceutical companies providing signiﬁcantly more forward
looking nonﬁnancial information than other industries, while construc-
tion and electrical equipment provide signiﬁcantly less historical ﬁnancial
disclosure.TherearesigniﬁcantcountryeﬀectsacrossBelgium,Germany,
and the Netherlands. This is not surprising given the diﬀerent legal and
institutional setting, as well as cultural and ﬁnancial reporting diﬀerences
among these countries. Of the six disclosure categories examined in this
paper, higher levels of strategic and management disclosures are provided
by Belgian and Dutch companies, by companies in the pharmaceutical
industry, by companies with an international orientation, and by large
companies, after controlling for the remaining independent variables.
Furthermore, our results show that voluntary disclosure of forward
looking nonﬁnancial information is signiﬁcantly associated with lower
levels of dispersion and higher levels of accuracy in analysts’ earnings
forecasts. Disclosure of historical nonﬁnancial information does not
appeartoaﬀectthecharacteristicsofanalysts’forecasts.Giventheﬁnding
that high levels of voluntary forward looking nonﬁnancial information
improve the prediction of a company’s future performance, there is an
incentive for competitors to provide highly transparent company
information locally and internationally. Increased disclosure of non-
ﬁnancial information may help to level the playing ﬁeld for ﬁnancial
analystsandinvestors.Internationalcorporatedisclosureofbothﬁnancial
and nonﬁnancial information may improve the proper allocation of
economic resources across and within capital markets.
There are limitations inherent in our study. Our sample size is small
giventhetime-consumingprocessofdatacollection.Althougheveryeﬀort
was made to ensure a uniform coding of company disclosure scores, this
process was inevitably subjective. Also, by focusing on a single year’s
ﬁnancialstatements,weeliminatethepotentialconfoundingeﬀectsoftime
seriesvariationsindisclosurepolicies,butwelimitthegeneralapplicability
of our conclusions. Finally, there may be factors inﬂuencing nonﬁnancial
disclosures for which we fail to control. For instance, a company could be
foreign-owned or controlled, it could have a long-range strategic plan to
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r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003.enterforeignmarkets,oritmayrelyonforeignsourcesofdebt.Allofthese
potential inﬂuences could aﬀect our results, although in general, their
existence would make it more diﬃcult to observe cultural diﬀerences.
Until nonﬁnancial harmonization occurs, companies can gain insights
from this study about the levels of, and inﬂuences upon, nonﬁnancial
disclosures of companies domiciled in Belgium, Germany and the
Netherlands. In regard to business reporting, the FASB Status Report
(May 2001) states, ‘The best set of solutions will come from national and
international standardsettersworkingtogether.Theissuesare notlimited
to a speciﬁc country and probably do not lend themselves to an answer
developed by one accounting standard setter acting in isolation.’
To improve our understanding of the value relevance of nonﬁnancial
information for ﬁnancial analysts, researchers could examine the
nonﬁnancialitemsinourstudytodeterminewhetherthereisarelationship
between available nonﬁnancial items in corporate annual reports and in
the stock reports prepared by the analyst. With an increasing emphasis on
the value of nonﬁnancial disclosure, a before-1990 and after-1990
8 study
might shed some light on the speciﬁc nonﬁnancial disclosures that aid
analysts in making their stock recommendations.
With the recent relaxing of many disclosure requirements for non-US
ﬁrms listed on US stock exchanges, non-US ﬁrms might ﬁnd the use of
nonﬁnancial disclosures more satisfactory than extensive ﬁnancial
disclosures (which can be quite diﬃcult to measure and understand).
Saudagaran and Biddle (1995) note that countries with extensive and
costly accounting disclosures and pre-registration requirements discou-
rage listings of foreign ﬁrms. If nonﬁnancial disclosures become
harmonized, researchers can eventually track whether nonﬁnancial
disclosures are helpful in increasing cross-border listings.
Appendix: Disclosure Scoring System
Forward-Looking Nonﬁnancial Information
Environment Around the Company
Ability of new companies to enter the industry
Ability of substitute products or services to displace those of reporting company
Company’s relationships with others
Competitors and their positions within the industry
Changes in markets, competition, or technology
Competitive advantages and disadvantages (identity, source, and sustainability)
Description of company’s industry structure
Growth or shrinkage in market share
Information about economy, company’s industry, and company itself
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Recent changes in environment; nature and timing of company’s response
Regulation and legislation aﬀecting segment
Strategy and Management
Consistency of strategy with external trends and with managerial approach
Enabling infrastructures
a) organizational structure, b) business strategy,
c) management philosophy, d) employee incentives
Financial information by management responsibility
Goals for return on assets, equity, and capitalization ratio
Identity and background of directors and management
Identity and description of management incentive plans
Identity of major shareholders, all shares owned, and by directors, management, &
employees
Information about compensation committee interlocks & insider participation in
decisions
Major goals, strategy, and factors that are critical to successfully implementing strategies
Methods of conducting the business
Mission, broad objectives, and strategy to achieve broad objectives
Nature of disagreements with prior directors, bankers, independent auditors, and lead
counsel
Need to know the major segments by which management operates the company
Types and amounts of director/management compensation and methods used to compute
Company Trends
Beneﬁcial or detrimental circumstances in which the company is involved and that may
cause increase or decrease cash ﬂows in the future
Changes in ﬁnancial position and why
Company’s ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, changes and why (identify sources of liquidity)
Explanation of relationships and changes among the data
Qualitative forward-looking information
a) Forecasts, b) Prospective Information, c) Plans and Objectives
Historical Nonﬁnancial Information
Environment of the Company
Description of business and industry structure
Employee involvement & fulﬁllment-rate of change in it
General development of the business-major events in last 5 years
Number of employees, average compensation of employees
Related party identity and description of relationship
Scope and description of the business and related properties
Seasonality and cyclicality
Production
Amount and quality of key resources and related suppliers
Deﬁnition of industry (or other segment)
Description and duration of important patents, trademarks, etc.
Description of nature of operations and current vulnerability due to concentrations
Description of principal products/services
Growth in units sold or average prices of units sold
Information about geographic concentrations in the production base
Information about the change in the nature of the warranty for a product
Innovation
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suppliers
Nonﬁnancial historical business information (often about ten years) – backlog ﬁgures
Recent process, product, or service innovations; sources and consequences
Relative bargaining power of resource providers
Resource provider satisfaction
Timeliness to perform key activities (production, delivery, developing new products)
Trends in sales, sales prices, unit costs and reasons why
Volume and prices of materials consumed
Where products are produced and where they are delivered
Customers
Information about geographic concentrations in the sales base of a company
Information about technological and regulatory change that may aﬀect the market
Information from a marketing, merchandising, and distribution point of view
Large increases or decreases in the proportion of products or services sold to largest
customers
Major contractual relationships
Market acceptance-changes in prices, volumes, and products, and why
Market penetration and quality
Measures of customer satisfaction
Relative bargaining power of customers
Notes
1. The Adhikari et al. (1998) study examined the information needs of ﬁnancial analysts
across culturalcategories. TheABTresearchersfounddiﬀerencesacrosscultural categories
in the perceived need for disclosure of factors which they term ‘nonﬁnancial’, ‘control’, and
‘annual report’. They also reported the relative rankings of the factors included in their
survey. After audited ﬁnancial statements, the majority of items in the top third of the
44-item list comprise nonﬁnancial information of a ‘forward looking’ or predictive nature.
Historical information items were ranked primarily at the bottom of the list. Most of the
itemsincludedintheABTsurveyaresimilartothoseindicatedasdesirablebyanalystsinthe
Jenkins Committee report.
2. On average, the use of one-month ahead forecasts will make the analysts’ forecasting
ability appear to be very good. This should make it more diﬃcult for us to detect cross-
sectional diﬀerences in forecasting accuracy, and hence, it should bias against our ﬁnding
any signiﬁcant cross-country eﬀects.
3. Asarobustnesstestwere-scalethesedisclosureindicesbygivinga1/2weighttoeachof
the two categories (forward-looking and historical) and a 1/3 weight to each of the three
categories within each index, thus, equally weighting each category. The results (not
reported) are not substantively diﬀerent from those reported in Tables 6 and 7.
4. A low reported value corresponds with high accuracy.
5. Note that analyzing the data with OLS give substantively similar results. Hence, the
results are not sensitive to the estimation technique.
6. Giventhestrongcorrelationbetweentotalsalesandthenumberofanalystsfollowinga
company, we re-run the regression without the number of analysts variable. The results
remain unchanged.
7. Outliers for analyst forecast data were deleted; in total, six observations.
8. The year 1990 is approximately the time during which the AICPA and the AIMR
(ﬁnancial analysts) were involved in their detailed discussions about types of useful
information for company analysis.
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